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2Four main landlocked-transit
the organization and background of the study and the base theoretical explanation were
introduced, followed by three analytical chapters. In the second chapter, the transit fee and
transportation subsidy were analyzed. In this model, it is assumed that the coastal (transit)
country imposes the transit fee while the landlocked country subsidizes its firm transportation.
As the landlocked firm needs to use the seaport which is located in the coastal (transit) country,
then it needs to pay the transit fee. The transit fee consists of all transit charges, i.e. truck fee,
driver fee, and carnet. In the third chapter, the transportation cost reducing R&D and transit fee
were analyzed. It is assumed that the landlocked firm invests in a process of reducing its
transportation costs, i.e. packaging, quality maintaining technology, and fuel-efficient technology.
Meanwhile the landlocked government subsidizes i
the landlocked firm is subject to the transit fee of the transit country. In the fourth chapter, the
the transit fee, the landlocked and coastal (transit) countries are assumed to be providing the
transportation infrastructure non-cooperatively. The landlocked and coastal countries are
assumed to provide the transportation infrastructure non-cooperatively. Meanwhile, the coastal
(transit) country charges the transit fee. All models are based on the international imperfect
competition analysis of the third-market model.
3The first model has demonstrated that both policies are optimal. Therefore, the
landlocked government attempts to reduce its firm transportation cost burden by directly
subsidizing the unit transportation cost. Meanwhile, the coastal (transit) has the credibility to
impose the transit fee in order to help its firm capture international market shares. This model is
based on the initial paper that has been presented at the Hitotsubashi Conference on International
Trade and Industrial Organization, 31 July 1 August, 2010, Hitotsubashi University, Japan,
ndlocked and Coastal Countries, and Strategic
positive and so is the transit fee. The landlocked country may use the indirect subsidy since the
direct transportation subsidy is considered as export subsidies. This model has been published in
the Review of Development Economics, 18 (4), 804-812
between Landlocked and Coastal Countries: An analysis of Strategic Exp
paper was written with Prof. Ishii Yasunori.
In the third model, it is proven that the infrastructure provisions of both countries are
optimal. Despite the landlocked firm needs to pay the transit fee, it gains the benefit of the
coasta
that has been published in the proceeding of the Canadian Economic Association (CEA)
43rd Annual Conference 28-31 May, 2009, University of Toronto, Canada, with the title
4n which it is accepted to be
presented at the International Association Maritime Economists (IAME) 2015 Conference,
August 24-26, 2015, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
This thesis has highlighted the three main agendas in the Almaty Programme of Actions
which has been announced by the United Nations. This global development policy has been
implemented in order to solve the problem of the landlocked country and its transit countries.
Thus, the present work has presented an insight into this problem by studying it in the strategic
trade policy analysis framework.
The study also has contributed to new knowledge in several ways. First, it applies the
transportation. Second, it introduces an asymmetrical geographical condition into the strategic
trade policy model. Third, the study proves that the transportation costs are beyond the distance.
And, finally, it proposes that transit revenue is an applicable policy.
